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Abstract
We provide a theoretical framework to discuss the relation between market size and
vertical structure in the railway industry. The framework is based on a simple downstream
monopoly model with two input suppliers, labor forces and the rail infrastructure ¯rm. The
operation of the downstream ¯rm (i.e., the train operating ¯rm) generates costs on the rail
infrastructure ¯rm. We show that the downstream ¯rm with a larger market size is more
likely to integrate with the rail infrastructure ¯rm. This is consistent with the phenomenon
in the railway industry.
JEL classi¯cation: L22, L13, R32
Key words: vertical integration, railway industry, market size, vertical coordination
¤The authors gratefully acknowledge ¯nancial support from Grant-in-Aid for Encouragement of Young Sci-
entists and for Basic Research from the Japanese Ministry of Education, Science and Culture. Any errors are
the responsibility of the authors.
yCorresponding author: Noriaki Matsushima, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University,
Mihogaoka 6-1, Ibaraki, Osaka 567-0047, Japan. Phone: +81-6-6879-8571. E-mail: nmatsush@iser.osaka-u.ac.jp
1
1 Introduction
Vertically integrated and separated ¯rms coexist in many industries, a typical case being the
rail industry. An important issue in the rail industry is whether to pursue a vertical sepa-
ration policy, whereby a rail company is divided into two organizations, one responsible for
rail operation and the other for rail infrastructure. There have been several variations in the
vertical separation policy, including functional accounting separation (e.g. France in late 90s),
organizational separation of rail operations and infrastructure (e.g. the UK, Netherlands), or
organizational separation involving a holding company (e.g. Germany). While vertical sepa-
ration has been carried out in some countries, massive horizontal separation of former state
railways has been adopted in others (e.g. the UK and Japan). One important aim of orga-
nizational reforms in the rail industry is to create a competitive environment, with a vertical
separation policy viewed as one option for stimulating competition.
There are quite clear policy di®erences between Europe and Japan. While vertical sepa-
ration is a common policy in the European Union, vertical integration is still the structure
of choice in the Japanese rail industry, notwithstanding the increasing incidence of vertical
separation in local areas in Japan, such as in the cases of Aomori Railway and Sanriku Rail-
way. While there are many examples of vertically separated railways in Europe, theoretical
studies describing behavior resulting from this policy are few. We therefore provide an analytic
framework to investigate this problem.
This paper investigates what factors determine the organization structure of railway com-
panies. We construct a simple model including three players: a train operating company (¯rm
T ), a rail infrastructure company (¯rm R), and a labor union (group L). Firm R and group L
respectively supply an essential input (e.g., the usage of rails) and labor force to ¯rm T . Using
those factors, ¯rm T supplies some units of the travel service to consumers who enjoy the travel
service. By comparing their pro¯ts in the two situations of vertical integration and vertical
separation, ¯rms R and T determine whether or not they should be integrated vertically. We
take into account the following factor: the operation by ¯rm T generates costs on ¯rm R.
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Those costs include track maintenance, electrical systems maintenance, and the depreciation
of infrastructure. Firm R must pay a daily e®ort to reduce those track-related costs. This
factor is important in ordinal track maintenance activities in the railway industry.
We show that ¯rms R and T decide to integrate vertically if and only if the market size
is large or the parameter related to the e®ort cost is small. The intuition behind the result is
as follows. The quantity supplied by ¯rm T depends on the input prices set by group L and
¯rm R. Because the inputs supplied by group L and ¯rm R are perfect complements, the sum
of the input prices a®ects the quantity supplied by ¯rm T . A higher input price set by an
input supplier reduces the quantity supplied by ¯rm T . Anticipating the shrink in quantity,
another input supplier sets a lower input price. That is, the strategic interaction between the
two suppliers is strategic substitution. Vertical separation is a credible commitment to set
a higher input price of ¯rm R. The rent-shifting from group L to ¯rm R is bene¯cial from
the viewpoint of ¯rms R and T . This e®ect depends on the market size. An increase in the
market size enhances the quantity supplied by ¯rm T . The increase in the quantity enlarges
the importance of the reduction in per unit costs caused by the operation of ¯rm T . That is,
the vertical coordination between ¯rms R and T becomes more important. To enhance the
bene¯t from the e®ort for per unit cost reductions, ¯rm R lowers its input price to increase the
quantity supplied by ¯rm T . This implies that the rent-shifting e®ect of vertical separation
becomes weak as the market size increases. The negative e®ect of coordination failure caused
by vertical separation dominates the positive e®ect of the rent-shifting if the market size is
large. Therefore, ¯rms R and T vertically integrate if the market size is large. The result
captures the conjecture suggested by Williamson (1985, p. 94): A larger ¯rm will also be more
likely to integrate if economies of scale in the \upstream" process result in lower costs for the
large ¯rm's own-production compared to a small ¯rm.
The key feature of this model is that more than one input is required for the ¯nal product
of the downstream monopolist.1 This feature is consistent with the examples mentioned above.
1 This setting is related to models with complementary suppliers (Economides and Salop (1992), Nalebu®
(2000), Baldwin and Woodard (2007), Casadesus-Masanell et al. (2007), and Maruyama and Minamikawa
(2009)). Those papers discuss how mergers among complementary suppliers appear and/or how those mergers
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The model can be also applied to other industries. For instance, in the aircraft industry
two major ¯rms, Airbus and Boeing, rely heavily on ¯rm-speci¯c inputs (e.g., engines, wings,
horizontal stabilizers) produced by independent manufacturers, and then sell their aircraft to
airline companies, which are ¯nal customers (Beelaerts van Blokland et al. (2008)).
Several researchers have investigated how the structure of vertical organizations is deter-
mined in competitive environments (Bonanno and Vickers (1988), Gal-Or (1999), Choi and
Yi (2000), Chen (2001, 2005), Lin (2006), Arya et al. (2008), Matsushima (2009)). Although
these papers consider downstream competition to derive results for vertical separation, we show
that vertical separation is pro¯table even with only one downstream ¯rm. Two exceptions are
Laussel (2008) and Matsushima and Mizuno (2009) who explicitly incorporate complementary
inputs in attempts to examine why vertical integration does not occur. Besides several di®er-
ences in the setup, the present paper di®ers from Laussel (2008) and Matsushima and Mizuno
(2009) as our focus is primarily on the relation among vertical separation, market size, and
the di±culty to reduce operation costs. The last factor is not incorporated into the models in
Laussel (2008) and Matsushima and Mizuno (2009).
In a broad sense, since Coase's seminal work (1937), researchers have discussed the problem
of vertical integration/separation with a transaction-cost-based approach. The related papers
mainly deal with well-known hold-up problems that illustrate the underinvestment hypothesis
(e.g., Grout (1984) and Tirole (1986)). Coase (1937) suggested that transaction costs might be
avoided or reduced via other organizational structures, and Klein et al. (1978) and Williamson
(1979) suggested vertical integration as an organizational response. The focus of this approach
has been on comparing costs internal to a transaction, between organizing the transaction
within a ¯rm or through the market.2 Complementary to the transaction-cost based approach,
change equilibrium outcomes. Such complementary suppliers provide their products directly to consumers.
This setting is quite di®erent from ours. Note that the meaning of the term `vertical integration' in these
papers is di®erent from that in our paper. Although a merger among complementary suppliers is called `vertical
integration' in these papers, in our model the term indicates a merger between an upstream and a downstream
¯rm.
2 Using the property rights approach to address the question of whether vertical integration can escape the
hold-up problem, Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990) considered how a particular ownership
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this paper incorporating multiple inputs into the standard models with vertical relations.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 explains the basic model
and shows the main result. Section 3 extends the basic model. Section 4 provides concluding
remarks.
2 Model
We explain the market structure in this paper.
There are three players related to train service provision to consumers. Firm T (Train
operating company) supplies some units of the train operation service to consumers. Firm R
(Rail infrastructure company) supplies an essential input (call it product r), in this case track
related to infrastructure, to ¯rm T . Group L (Labor union) supplies labor (call it product l)
to ¯rm T . Consumers enjoy the train travel service. Inverse demand for the service is given as
follows:
p = ®¡ ¯q; (1)
where p is the price, q is the quantity supplied by ¯rm T , and ® and ¯ are positive constants.3
Firm T needs one unit of product l and one unit of product r to produce one unit of train
travel service. Firm R and group L individually o®er per unit wholesale price wr and per unit
wage of labor wl to ¯rm T . The following ¯gure depicts the market structure in this model.
[Figure 1 here]
Firm T generates a cost for ¯rm R. The cost is positively correlated to the quantity supplied
by ¯rm T , q. We assume that the cost is Cq where C is a positive constant.
structure a®ects the parties' exposure to hold-ups. Che and S¶akovics (2008) provided an excellent brief survey of
the hold-up problem. The topic of vertical foreclosure is also related to the problem of vertical integration. The
vertical foreclosure issue primarily concerns the relation between vertical integration and the competitiveness of
downstream ¯rms (e.g., Ordover et al. (1990) and Hart and Tirole (1990)). See also O'Brien and Sha®er (1992),
McAfee and Schwartz (1994), Gaudet and Long (1996), Ma (1997), Riordan (1998), and Choi and Yi (2000).
Rey and Tirole (2007) provide an excellent survey of the literature.
3In Section 3.1, we use a more generalized demand function.
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Let u brie°y mention the cost structure in the railway industry. The role of a train operating
company (¯rm T ) is to provide service by running trains. Although the train operating company
holds rolling stock and employees such as engineers and conductors, this company borrows rail
tracks from a rail infrastructure company (¯rm R), to which it pays infrastructure charges.
The rail infrastructure company holds rail infrastructure, maintaining tracks and electrical
systems. Therefore, while the main costs of the train operating company are for labor, energy,
administration, rolling stock, and infrastructure rental, the main costs of the rail infrastructure
company are for track maintenance, electrical systems maintenance, and the depreciation of
infrastructure. We believe that this accurately summarizes the cost structure of this industry.
Firm R has an ability to reduce C through its e®ort. The constant C changes from c to c¡e
if ¯rm R pays its e®ort e and incurs the e®ort cost °e2 where c and ° are positive constants.
Assumption 1 To secure that the equilibrium price p is positive, we assume that ¯° ¸ 1=3.
Given the quantity supplied by ¯rm T is q, the consumer surplus is given as follows:
CS ´
Z q
0
(®¡ ¯m) dm¡ (®¡ ¯q)q = ¯q
2
2
:
The social surplus is the sum of the consumer surplus and the total pro¯ts in this market.
We investigate the incentive of ¯rms R and T to integrate vertically. To do so, we consider
two vertical structures: (1) Firms R and T are vertically separated; (2) Firms R and T are
vertically integrated.
Vertical separation When ¯rms R and T are vertically separated, the objective functions
of the three players are given as follows:
¼L = wlq; ¼T = (p¡ wl ¡ wr)q; ¼R = wrq ¡ (c¡ e)q ¡ °e2:
In standard oligopoly models with labor unions, each downstream ¯rm negotiates with its
labor union, which maximizes the product of its wage level and number of employees (for
examples, see Horn and Wolinsky (1988a,1988b), Davidson (1988), Dowrick (1989), Mumford
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and Dowrick (1994), Naylor (2002), Lommerud et al. (2003), and Lommerud et al. (2009)).
The model used here is the standard one concerning the objective function of labor union.
In this case, the game runs as follows:
1. Group L and ¯rm R o®er per unit wage level (wl) and per unit wholesale price (i.e.,
infrastructure charge) (wr) to ¯rm T .
2. Given the wage level and the wholesale price, ¯rm R sets its e®ort level e and ¯rm T sets
the amount of service q simultaneously.
Note that the timing of the game implies that ¯rm R's e®ort does not have a nature of
investment (credible commitment). If it has a nature of investment, the timing of the e®ort
choice should be earlier than that of wage setting. Firm R's cost generated by ¯rm T is related
to the operation of ¯rm T . Firm R has to pay its daily e®ort to reduce this cost. To capture
the property of the cost-reducing e®orts, we have assumed that the e®ort level e is determined
after the wage and the wholesale price are determined. We discuss how the timing structure
a®ects the decision of vertical integration/separation in Section 3.2.
Vertical integration When ¯rms R and T are vertically integrated (call them ¯rm I), the
objective functions of the two players are given as:
¼L = wlq; ¼I = (p¡ wl)q ¡ (c¡ e)q ¡ °e2;
where I indicates the integrated ¯rm. ¼I is the sum of ¼T and ¼R in the case of vertical
separation. The game runs as follows:
1. Group L o®ers per unit wage level (wl) to I.
2. Given the wage level, I sets its e®ort level e and the amount of service q simultaneously.
2.1 Vertical separation
We solve the game by backward induction.
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In the second stage, the pro¯ts of ¯rms T and R are given as:
¼T = (®¡ ¯q ¡ wl ¡ wr)q;
¼R = wrq ¡ (c¡ e)q ¡ °e2:
The ¯rst-order conditions of the ¯rms lead to the quantity supplied by ¯rm T and the e®ort
level of ¯rm R given the wage level and the wholesale price:8>>><>>>:
@¼T
@q
= ®¡ 2¯q ¡ wl ¡ wr = 0;
@¼R
@e
= q ¡ 2°e = 0;
!
8>>><>>>:
q(wl; wr) =
®¡ wl ¡ wr
2¯
;
e(wl; wr) =
®¡ wl ¡ wr
4¯°
:
In the ¯rst stage, anticipating the outcome in the second stage, group L and ¯rmRmaximize
their objectives:
¼L = wlq(wl; wr) =
wl(®¡ wl ¡ wr)
2¯
;
¼R = wrq(wl; wr)¡ (c¡ e(wl; wr))q(wl; wr)¡ °(e(wl; wr))2
=
(®¡ wl ¡ wr)(®¡ wl + (8¯° ¡ 1)wr ¡ 8¯°c)
16¯2°
:
Their reaction functions are given by the following functions and summarized as Figure 2.
wl(wr) =
®¡ wr
2
; wr(wl) =
(4¯° ¡ 1)®+ 4¯°c¡ (4¯° ¡ 1)wl
8¯° ¡ 1 :
[Figure 2 here]
When the market size increases (i.e., a decrease in ¯), the reaction function of R moves down-
ward (see Figure 2). To understand the reason, we can rewrite the pro¯t of ¯rm R as follows:
¼R = (wr ¡ c)q(wl; wr) + fe(wl; wr)q(wl; wr)¡ °(e(wl; wr))2g
=
8¯(wr ¡ c)(®¡ wl ¡ wr)
16¯2°
+
(®¡ wl ¡ wr)2
16¯2°
:
The ¯rst term is the direct net pro¯t through its input. The second term is the `gain' from the
reduction of the negative externalities caused by ¯rm T . This equation shows that an increase in
the market size (i.e., a decrease in ¯) enhances the relative importance of the gain from the cost
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reduction (the second term). The second term is positively correlated to the quantity supplied
by ¯rm T . Note that, the marginal gain from the cost reduction is @¼R=@e = q(wl; wr)¡ 2°e.
Because @q(wl; wr)=@wr < 0, the positive correlation between the second term and q(wl; wr)
implies that an increase in the wholesale price set by ¯rm R, wr, monotonically decreases the
second term. The second term is more important for the pro¯tability of ¯rm R as the market
size increases. Therefore, the wholesale price of ¯rm R monotonically decreases in the market
size (i.e., a decrease in ¯).
Solving the simultaneous equations (the reaction functions), we have
w¤l =
4¯°(®¡ c)
12¯° ¡ 1 ; w
¤
r =
(4¯° ¡ 1)®+ 8¯°c
12¯° ¡ 1 ; e
¤ =
®¡ c
12¯° ¡ 1 ; q
¤ =
2°(®¡ c)
12¯° ¡ 1 :
The equilibrium pro¯ts, the consumer surplus, and the social surplus are given as follows:
¼¤L =
8¯°2(®¡ c)2
(12¯° ¡ 1)2 ; ¼
¤
R =
(8¯° ¡ 1)°(®¡ c)2
(12¯° ¡ 1)2 ; ¼
¤
T =
4¯°2(®¡ c)2
(12¯° ¡ 1)2 ;
CS¤ =
2¯°2(®¡ c)2
(12¯° ¡ 1)2 ; SW
¤ =
(22¯° ¡ 1)°(®¡ c)2
(12¯° ¡ 1)2 :
As a result, the sum of pro¯ts ¼R and ¼T is as follows:
¼¤R + ¼
¤
T =
(®¡ c)2°
12¯° ¡ 1 :
2.2 Vertical integration
We solve the game by backward induction.
In the second stage, the pro¯t of ¯rm I and its ¯rst-order conditions are expressed as
follows:
¼I = (®¡ ¯q ¡ wl ¡ (c¡ e))q ¡ °e2;
@¼I
@q
= ®¡ 2¯q ¡ wl ¡ (c¡ e) = 0;
@¼I
@e
= q ¡ 2°e = 0:
The ¯rst-order conditions lead to
q(wl) =
2°(®¡ c¡ wl)
4¯° ¡ 1 ; e(wl) =
®¡ c¡ wl
4¯° ¡ 1 :
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In the ¯rst stage, anticipating the outcome in the second stage, group L maximizes its
objective:
¼L = wlq(wl) =
2wl°(®¡ c¡ wl)
4¯° ¡ 1 :
The maximization problems lead to
w¤¤l =
®¡ c
2
; e¤¤ =
®¡ c
2(4¯° ¡ 1) ; q
¤¤ =
°(®¡ c)
4¯° ¡ 1 :
The equilibrium pro¯ts, the consumer surplus, and the social surplus are given as
¼¤¤L =
°(®¡ c)2
2(4¯° ¡ 1) ; ¼
¤¤
I =
°(®¡ c)2
4(4¯° ¡ 1) ; CS
¤¤ =
¯°2(®¡ c)2
2(4¯° ¡ 1)2 ; SW
¤¤ =
(14¯° ¡ 3)°(®¡ c)2
4(4¯° ¡ 1)2 :
2.3 Comparison
We ¯rst compare the several values of cases of vertical separation and vertical integration,
which are derived in the previous subsections. Simple calculus leads to the following relations:
w¤l < w
¤¤
l ; e
¤ < e¤¤; q¤ < q¤¤; ¼¤L < ¼
¤¤
L ; SW
¤ < SW ¤¤:
Vertical separation causes the standard double marginalization problem. As a result, this
reduces the quantity supplied by ¯rm T (i.e., the consumer surplus) and the social surplus.
Therefore, vertical integration is preferable from the viewpoint of both consumer and social
welfare. However, it does not occur for a larger parameter range as the following equation shows.
When we compare the pro¯t di®erences between vertical separation and vertical integration:
¼¤¤I ¡ (¼¤R + ¼¤T ) =
°(®¡ c)2
4(4¯° ¡ 1) ¡
°(®¡ c)2
12¯° ¡ 1 =
(3¡ 4¯°)°(®¡ c)2
4(4¯° ¡ 1)(12¯° ¡ 1) :
This result is summarized as the following proposition:
Proposition 1 Under Assumption 1, vertical integration is preferable for ¯rms T and R if
and only if ¯° < 3=4.
Vertical separation induces group L to lower its wage. The quantity supplied by ¯rm T is
q(wl; wr) which is decreasing in wl and wr. Firm R sets its wholesale price at a positive level
(wr > 0), although wr = 0 when ¯rm R is integrated by ¯rm T . Because of the higher value
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of wr in the case of vertical separation, the monopoly power of group L for ¯rm T is weaker
than that in the case of vertical integration. This means that a portion of the monopoly pro¯t
of group L is transferred to ¯rm R through `competition' between the complementary input
suppliers (Cournot (1838) and Sonnenschein (1968)). The rent-shifting from group L to ¯rm R
is bene¯cial from the viewpoint of ¯rms R and T . However, this e®ect depends on the market
size. As explained earlier, as the market size becomes larger (i.e., ¯ becomes smaller), the
wholesale price of ¯rm R, wR, becomes lower. This lower wholesale price allows group L to set
a higher wage, wL. This means that the rent-shifting e®ect is weak if the market size is large.
Therefore, the negative e®ect of coordination failure caused by vertical separation dominates
the positive e®ect of the rent-shifting if the market size is large (i.e., ¯ is small).
3 Extensions
We extend the basic model to two directions. First, we generalize the demand function. Second,
we change the timing structure of the basic models. We consider models in which ¯rm R engages
in cost-reducing activities in the ¯rst stage, although in the previous section, it carries out those
activities in the ¯nal stage.
3.1 General function
First, we discuss the level of robustness in the outcome derived in the previous subsections.
We assume that the inverse demand function is given as P (Q=s) where Q is the quantity
supplied and s represents the market size. The pro¯ts of ¯rms T and R are given as follows:
¼T = (P (Q=s)¡ wR ¡ wL)Q; ¼R = wRQ¡ (c¡ e)Q¡ I(e):
The ¯rst-order conditions are given as
@¼T
@Q
= P (Q=s)¡ wR ¡ wL + P 0(Q=s)Q=s = 0;
@¼R
@e
= Q¡ I 0(e) = 0:
We arrange @¼T =@Q as follows:
@¼T
@Q
= P ( ~Q)¡ wR ¡ wL + P 0( ~Q) ~Q = 0;
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where ~Q ´ Q=s. The value of ~Q is derived by the above equation. This does not depend on
the value of s but depend only on the sum of wR and wL. We can write the optimal quantity
supplied by ¯rm T as follows:
Q = s ~Q(wL; wR):
Using the equation @¼T =@Q = 0, we show how an increase of wj changes Q(wL; wR) (j = L;R).
Given the values of s and wi, the simple comparative statics of @¼T =@Q = 0 with respect to Q
and wj (i = L;R and i 6= j) leads to
dQ(wL; wR)
dwj
=
1
SOCT
< 0;
where SOCT represents the second-order condition of ¼T .
The objectives of group L and ¯rm R are given as
¼L = swL ~Q(wL; wR);
¼R = swR ~Q(wL; wR)¡ (c¡ e(s ~Q(wL; wR)))s ~Q(wL; wR)¡ I(e(s ~Q(wL; wR))):
The ¯rst-order conditions are given as
@¼L
@wL
= s
"
~Q(wL; wR) + wL
@ ~Q(wL; wR)
@wL
#
= 0;
@¼R
@wR
= s
"
~Q(wL; wR) + (wR ¡ c+ e(s ~Q(wL; wR)))@
~Q(wL; wR)
@wR
#
= 0:
First, we ¯nd that wL(wR) derived by the equation @¼L=@wL = 0 does not depend on the
value of s. Second, we show that the value of @¼R=@wR between the brackets monotonically
decreases in s. Di®erentiating it with respect to s, we obtain:
@
@s
µ
@¼R
@wR
¢ 1
s
¶
= e0(s ~Q(wL; wR)) ~Q(wL; wR)
@ ~Q(wL; wR)
@wR
< 0:
This is because e0(s ~Q(wL; wR))) is an increasing function (see @¼R=@e) and @ ~Q(wL; wR)=@wR
is negative. The two properties are consistent with Figure 2.
3.2 Does the timing of cost-reducing investments matter?
We consider the models in which ¯rm R engages in cost-reducing activities in the ¯rst stage
although it does in those activities in the ¯nal production stage in the previous section. Except
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the timing structures, the structures of the games are the same with those in the previous
section. We explain the timing of the games.
Assumption 2 To secure that the equilibrium price p is positive, we assume that ¯° ¸ 1=12.
In the case of vertical separation, the game runs as follows:
1. Firm R sets its e®ort level e.
2. Observing the e®ort level, group L and ¯rm R o®er per unit wage level (wl) and per unit
wholesale price (wr) to ¯rm T .
3. Given the e®ort level, the wage level, and the wholesale price, ¯rm T sets the amount of
service q.
Note that the timing of the game implies that ¯rm R's e®ort has a nature of investment
(credible commitment).
In the case of vertical integration, the game runs as follows:
1. Firm I sets its e®ort level e.
2. Observing the e®ort level, group L o®ers per unit wage level (wl) to ¯rm I.
3. Given the e®ort and the wage levels, ¯rm I sets the amount of service q.
The calculus of the two cases lead to the following proposition (the calculus is summarized
in the Appendix):
Proposition 2 Under Assumption 2, vertical separation is preferable for ¯rms T and R for
any ¯°.
Under vertical separation, ¯rm R has full bargaining power over ¯rm T . This means that
¯rm R internalizes its e®ort to reduce its marginal cost.4 Vertical integration does not greatly
in°uence coordination problems between ¯rms R and T . Reducing the rent shifting from ¯rm
4 Note that ¯rm R cannot fully internalize its e®ort. This is because group L also has full bargaining power
over ¯rm T . Group L deprives of some rents generated by ¯rm R through its wage setting.
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T to group L is more important from the viewpoint of the ¯rms. Therefore, vertical separation
is always preferable.
This result is quite di®erent from that in the previous section. In this section, the e®ort
cost of ¯rm R is sunk before the wage and the wholesale price are determined. In the previous
section, however, cost is incurred when ¯rm T sets its quantity supplied after the procurement
conditions are determined. This implies that a coordination problem exists between ¯rms R
and T . The discussion in this section clari¯es that, in the vertical structure discussed here, the
key factor of vertical integration is not the sunk-investment but the problem of coordination.
4 Concluding remarks
Vertically integrated and separated ¯rms coexist in many industries, including railway. We have
provided an analytic framework to investigate this problem. We show that the downstream
¯rm which has the larger market size is more likely to integrate with the rail infrastructure ¯rm.
This is consistent with the phenomenon in the Japanese railway industry. The result captures
the conjecture suggested by Williamson (1985, p. 94): A larger ¯rm will also be more likely
to integrate if economies of scale in the \upstream" process result in lower costs for the large
¯rm's own-production compared to a small ¯rm. Because many empirical studies infer that
the hypothesis of transaction cost economics holds (Lafontaine and Slade (2007)), we believe
that our prediction can be applied to many economic environments.
As Proposition 1 states, if market size increases, vertical integration is preferable, as shown
in current empirical ¯ndings of Mizutani and Uranishi (2011) regarding the rail industry. By
applying the total cost function to 30 railway organizations from 23 OECD countries for the 14
years between 1994 and 2007, Mizutani and Uranishi (2011) evaluate whether or not vertical
separation caused a reduction in costs. The authors show that vertical separation e®ects with
lower train density tend to reduce the total cost of a railway organization but as train density
increases, vertical separation causes total costs to increase. This result means that vertical
integration is preferable in the case of high train density while vertical separation is preferable
in the opposite case. In their empirical analysis, train density is used but the measure (i.e.
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train density) is highly related to market size. The de¯nition of train density is measured by
how many trains run in a given railway network. If the market size is larger, then more train
services are required in the market. Therefore, if rail organizations have a large market, it
means that the rail organizations have larger train density. Thus, current empirical results
support our theoretical implication.
As mentioned above, while vertical separation is a common policy in the European Union,
vertical integration is still the structure of choice in the Japanese rail industry. Among vertical
separation options, there are many variations. Within the largely vertically separated Euro-
pean rail industry, opinions have been voiced against the separation policy. Keeping in mind
these various circumstances, we will provide theoretical background that may prove helpful in
evaluating vertical separation policy in the rail industry.
In conclusion, our theoretical results show that policy related to vertical separation depends
on market size, with vertical integration appropriate in rail organizations with a large market
and vertical separation preferable in organizations with a small market. Based on our theoret-
ical results, the European Commission's policy, which is that vertical separation policy should
be applied everywhere, is not correct.
There are several ways to extend the monopoly model discussed here. Considering an
oligopoly model is a natural extension of the current model. For instance, we can consider
a situation in which two rail operation companies use the rails owned by two infrastructure
¯rms. In Japan, some vertically integrated railway companies use their own rails cooperatively
by operating their own trains from a terminal station owned by one of the companies to another
terminal station owned by the other company. We think that an extended model can capture
the essence of the Japanese and the EU railway industries and should be considered for future
research.
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Appendix
We solve the two cases discussed in Section 3.2.
Vertical separation We solve the game by backward induction.
In the third stage, the pro¯t of ¯rm T is given as:
¼T = (®¡ ¯q ¡ wl ¡ wr)q:
The ¯rst-order condition of the ¯rm leads to the quantity supplied by ¯rm T given the e®ort
and the wage levels and the wholesale price:
@¼T
@q
= ®¡ 2¯q ¡ wl ¡ wr = 0 ! q(wl; wr) = ®¡ wl ¡ wr2¯ :
In the second stage, anticipating the outcome in the third stage, group L and ¯rm R
maximize their objectives:
¼L = wlq(wl; wr) =
wl(®¡ wl ¡ wr)
2¯
;
¼R = (wr ¡ (c¡ e))q(wl; wr)¡ °e2 = (wr ¡ (c¡ e))(®¡ wl ¡ wr)2¯ ¡ °e
2:
Their reaction functions are given by the following functions.
wl(wr) =
®¡ wr
2
; wr(wl) =
®+ c¡ e¡ wl
2
:
Solving the simultaneous equations (the reaction functions), we have
wl(e) =
®¡ c+ e
3
; wr(e) =
®+ 2(c¡ e)
3
; q(e) =
®¡ c+ e
6¯
:
In the ¯rst stage, anticipating the outcome in the second and the third stages, ¯rm R
maximizes its objective:
¼R = (wr(e)¡ (c¡ e))q(e)¡ °e2 = (®¡ c+ e)
2
18¯
¡ °e2:
The ¯rst-order condition leads to
e¤ =
®¡ c
18¯° ¡ 1 ; w
¤
l =
6¯°(®¡ c)
18¯° ¡ 1 ; w
¤
r =
(6¯° ¡ 1)®+ 12¯°c
18¯° ¡ 1 :
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The equilibrium pro¯ts, the consumer surplus, and the social surplus are given as
¼¤L =
18¯°2(®¡ c)2
(18¯° ¡ 1)2 ; ¼
¤
R =
°(®¡ c)2
18¯° ¡ 1 ; ¼
¤
T =
9¯°2(®¡ c)2
(18¯° ¡ 1)2 ;
CS¤ =
9¯°2(®¡ c)2
2(18¯° ¡ 1)2 ; SW
¤ =
°(99¯° ¡ 2)(®¡ c)2
2(18¯° ¡ 1)2 :
The sum of pro¯ts ¼R and ¼T is
¼¤R + ¼
¤
T =
(27¯° ¡ 1)°(®¡ c)2
(18¯° ¡ 1)2 :
Vertical integration We solve the game by backward induction.
In the third stage, the pro¯t of ¯rm I and its ¯rst-order condition are
¼I = (®¡ ¯q ¡ wl ¡ (c¡ e))q ¡ °e2; @¼I
@q
= ®¡ 2¯q ¡ wl ¡ (c¡ e) = 0:
The ¯rst-order conditions lead to
q(wl; e) =
®¡ c+ e¡ wl
2¯
:
In the second stage, anticipating the outcome in the third stage, group L maximizes its
objective:
¼L = wlq(wl; e) =
wl(®¡ c+ e¡ wl)
2¯
:
The maximization problems lead to
wl(e) =
®¡ c+ e
2
; q(e) =
®¡ c+ e
4¯
:
In the ¯rst stage, the pro¯t of ¯rm I and its ¯rst-order condition are
¼I = (®¡ ¯q(e)¡ wl8e)¡ (c¡ e))q(e)¡ °e2 = (®¡ c+ e)
2
16¯
¡ °e2;
@¼I
@e
=
®¡ c+ e
8¯
¡ 2°e = 0:
The ¯rst-order conditions lead to
e¤¤ =
®¡ c
16¯° ¡ 1 ; w
¤¤
l =
8¯°(®¡ c)
16¯° ¡ 1 :
17
The equilibrium pro¯ts, the consumer surplus, and the social surplus are given as
¼¤¤L =
32¯°2(®¡ c)2
(16¯° ¡ 1)2 ; ¼
¤¤
I =
°(®¡ c)2
16¯° ¡ 1 ;
CS¤¤ =
8¯°2(®¡ c)2
(16¯° ¡ 1)2 ; SW
¤¤ =
°(56¯° ¡ 1)(®¡ c)2
(16¯° ¡ 1)2 :
We ¯rst compare the several values derived in the previous subsections. Simple calculus
lead to the following relations:
w¤l < w
¤¤
l ; e
¤ < e¤¤; q¤ < q¤¤; ¼¤L < ¼
¤¤
L ; SW
¤ < SW ¤¤:
The mechanism behind those inequalities is similar to that in the previous section.
Comparison The di®erence between the pro¯ts in the two cases is
¼¤¤I ¡ (¼¤R + ¼¤T ) =
°(®¡ c)2
16¯° ¡ 1 ¡
(27¯° ¡ 1)°(®¡ c)2
(18¯° ¡ 1)2 =
(7¡ 108¯°)¯°2(®¡ c)2
(18¯° ¡ 1)2(16¯° ¡ 1) < 0:
This result is summarized in Proposition 2 in the main text.
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